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Defendant.

ORDER
(Motion for New Trial—#144)

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1 Hicks made no comment on Mr. Davidson's testimony. Rather, he commented on the "potency" of
2 wiretap evidence in corruption cases and wondered aloud why Malone had not been indicted for the
3 Spring Valley casino bribery scheme.

4 His decision not to use Davidson's testimony was based upon Judge Hicks' finding
5 "that relevant conduct, in the Court's mind, almost always is directly related to the underlying
6 offense of conviction." Sentencing Transcript at 359. Thus, Judge Hicks felt the sentencing
7 guidelines prohibited him from considering Malone's alleged involvement in the Triple Five and
8 other bribery schemes. It was not Davidson's role or his testimony that caused Judge Hicks to
9 refuse to consider the evidence the United States trying to present on those activities.

10 There is no evidence that the Second Superseding Indictment resulted from
11 Defendant Davidson's exercising his right to testify on behalf of Malone at Malone's sentencing, or
12 was prompted by vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor.

13 **.II. SEVERANCE**

14 Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) permits the joinder of counts where they (1) are of the same or
15 similar character, or (2) are based on the same act or transaction, or (3) are connected with or
16 constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Note that the requirements are in the disjunctive.
17 Only one is required. The first ground is why several bank robberies by the same person or persons
18 are usually charged in a single indictment, even though they are separate events.

19 Davidson contends that all the acts are distinct, that there are no similarities, leading
20 to improper spillover of evidence. The evidence produced at trial justifies the findings of Judge
21 Leavitt, *i.e.*, that the two conspiracies were of the same or similar character and thus properly joined.
22 The factors which substantiate the Court's earlier decision are found here. They include "the
23 elements of the statutory offenses, the temporal proximity of the acts, the likelihood and extent of
24 evidentiary overlap, the physical location of the acts, the modus operandi of the crimes, and the
25 identity of the victims." At trial the evidence established identical schemes, temporal overlap of
26 approximately one year, the likelihood and extent of evidentiary overlap, same modus operandi, and

1 similar victims—John Hui and the public. *See United States v. Jawara*, 474 F.3d 565, 572-73 (9th
2 Cir.2007). The evidence overlap involved the John Hui matters and Lance Malone’s involvement in
3 both conspiracies. Regarding the Hui matters, the Defendant improperly influenced Kenny to vote
4 on Hui’s zoning application for the Ft. Apache project. Similarly, the Defendant attempted to
5 improperly influence McDonald to vote on Hui’s projects in the city, one of which was located on
6 Centennial Parkway and the other on Brent Lane.

7 The Defendant used Malone to attempt to bribe Dario Herrera in the CVS matter and
8 McDonald in the Hui matters in the city. Additionally, the Defendant suggested to Malone that he
9 was corruptly influencing Kenny in the Buffalo/DI matter. The Defendant told Malone that he
10 needed to teach Kenny how to keep her mouth shut after she spoke out about the effort to obtain
11 again an amendment to the land use plan for the Buffalo/DI property.

12 The best evidence of the fact that the joinder of the two conspiracies did not cause
13 improper or unduly prejudicial spillover is in the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on the Kenny
14 conspiracy counts. The jury was apparently able to segregate the facts. Nor is there any evidence
15 that the verdict was the result of a compromise. Had there been a compromise, one would expect
16 guilty and not guilty verdicts. Here, the jury found Defendant Davidson guilty of some, but
17 deadlocked on others.

18 **III. DUPLICITY AND STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS**

19 Defendant’s claim that Count One involves more than one conspiracy ignores both
20 the allegations of the indictment and the evidence presented. The Court has already incorporated
21 Judge Leavitt’s findings in his two reports and recommendations. Without quoting the paragraph in
22 full, found on page 3 of Report and Recommendation (#71) filed June 7, 2007, lines 3-15, the
23 Courts reiterates the authorities described therein.

24 In Count One of the Second Superseding Indictment, the Government charges that
25 Defendant Davidson was engaged in an ongoing scheme or conspiracy, which occurred over a
26 period of time and involved, in addition to the Defendant, a number of other people and activities,

1 but all of which were “to devise and execute a scheme and artifice to defraud, that is, a scheme and
2 artifice to deprive the County commission and the citizens of Clark County of their intangible right
3 to Kenny’s honest services for the private gain of Kenny and the defendants. . . .” The indictment
4 also alleged that the scheme also included the efforts to launder the proceeds of the said unlawful
5 activity. (Second Superseding Indictment (#40) at 6.)

6 To find this indictment duplicitous, we would have to conclude that,
7 as a matter of law, a description of the [three zoning schemes] neces-
8 sarily embraces more than a single scheme. The law of this circuit,
9 however, takes a broad view of single scheme: “the defrauding of
10 different people over an extended period of time, using different
11 means and representations, may constitute but one scheme.” [*United*
12 *States v. Mastelotto*, 717 F.2d 1238, 1245 (9th Cir.1983)] (quoting
13 *Owens v. United States*, 221 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 1955)). Under
14 this standard, the indictment may fairly be read to charge but a single
15 scheme and is therefore not duplicitous.

16 *United States v. Morse*, 785 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir.1986).

17 The evidence in this case supports a claim that the acts of Defendant Davidson, as
18 described in Count One were the result of one ongoing scheme, not several independent conspira-
19 cies. The primary actors were the same, the methods were the same, and the efforts were toward the
20 same intended result, *i.e.*, to ensure Kenny’s favorable vote and assistance in getting zoning matters
21 approved.

22 Defendant Davidson’s arguments about the statute of limitations ignore the foregoing
23 and fails to recognize that the statute of limitations began to run from the last overt act in the
24 conspiracy, not with individual overt acts. The indictment was filed well within the statute of
25 limitations and this argument is without merit.


26 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, including the reasons well-articulated in
the reports and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Leavitt, which have been adopted by this
Court and incorporated herein *in haec verba*, and good cause appearing therefor,

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1 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Donald M. Davidson's **Motion for New**
2 **Trial Pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33** (#144) is DENIED.

3 Dated: September 14, 2007.

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6 Roger L. Hunt
Chief United States District Judge
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